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Abstract
There is a plethora of studies on interest groups in the European Union. While these studies
have generated a wealth of insights, it is not actually clear what they have accomplished. This
Living Review seeks to identify those areas of interest group studies in which our knowledge
is fairly consolidated and in which major research gaps or major controversies can be noted. I
argue that these research gaps and controversies stem from both the empirical variance in the
interest group landscape and the theoretical segmentation of EU interest group studies. These
have been shaped by influences from Comparative Politics, International Relations, Policy
Analysis, and Democratic Theory. I suggest that future research should engage to a greater
extent in cross-cutting theoretical debates in order to overcome the pronounced demarcation
of research areas and in more rigorous theory testing than has sometimes been the case. The
article starts by discussing the problem of conceptualizing interest groups before moving on
to the fissured theoretical landscape. Thereafter, major research themes are discussed. First,
I review the relation between EU institutions and interest groups. Here, I look both into
multilevel governance and Europeanization studies that focus on the vertical interaction and
into analyses that stress the horizontal segmentation of the EU system in different institutions
and sectors. Second, I analyze core themes of EU and comparative interest group studies,
namely the issue of collective action, the access of interest groups to policy-makers and their
influence on EU policymaking.
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4 Rainer Eising
1 Introduction
Interest organizations have been steady companions of European integration. They have responded
and contributed to the growing importance of European Union (EU)/European Community (EC)
politics by promoting their cases readily before the EU institutions. Despite numerous empirical
studies that have generated a wealth of insights, our knowledge about them is still limited. The
existing body of literature demonstrates quite well why national groups join in the circuit of EU
collective action and what strategies of interest representation are available to them, but it has
also notable gaps, brought about some areas of controversy, and displays some contradictions in
its findings (for a similar view of U.S. interest groups, see Baumgartner and Leech 1998). In this
article, I review the state of the art in EU interest group research (for a more comprehensive review,
see Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008a) omitting the role of civil society in EU politics because
another Living Review is dedicated to this topic (see Finke 2007).
I argue that several reasons account for the contradictory points of view as well as the gaps in
the study of interest organizations in the EU: the difficulty to nail the interest group concept to the
wall, the variety of theoretical perspectives that stand in the way of a cumulation of knowledge, the
changing nature of the European polity, and the methodological focus on case studies and specific
units of observation. First, I reflect on the concepts of interest groups and interest organizations.
Then, I review the different theoretical strands that influenced EU interest group studies. Finally,
I look into major topics in this literature: I start by looking into the consequences of the EU
institutional setting for interest organizations. Then, I discuss the political mobilization, the
access to policy-makers, and the influence of groups on EU policy-making.
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2 The interest group concept
In most advanced capitalist democracies, the number of interest groups is very large indicating
that their political mobilization capacity is considerable. As an important implication, interest
group systems are loosely coupled and segmented into quite a few sub-systems. Unlike in party
systems, where all units of the system are said to operate according to the logic of party com-
petition, many interest groups have no relations at all. Moreover, several groups do not operate
according to a competitive logic but have developed a division of labor with other groups. As a
consequence of the variance within interest group systems, interest group studies face tremendous
difficulties to produce far reaching generalizations. They have not even managed to agree on a
common terminology for their central unit of observation: They focus on interest groups and orga-
nizations, special interest organizations, associations, political lobbies, civil society organizations,
social movement organizations, non-governmental organizations, non-profit groups, civic groups
etc. As a consequence of empirical variance and a wide variety of research interests, the research
field is heavily compartmentalized. While this variety can be regarded an indicator of a vibrant
research community, it must be noted that there is little communication between different strands
of the literature.
In this review essay, I use the conventional term ‘interest group’, although this label carries much
baggage (see Jordan and Maloney 2007). What are the key features or components which define
an interest group? For present purposes, a brief definition of this concept is in order. I propose
three factors (based on Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008b): organization, political interests, and
informality.
Organization relates to the nature of the group and excludes broad movements and waves of
public opinion that may influence policy outcomes as interest groups. Interest groups politics
concerns the political behavior of aggregated individuals or organizations. Political interest refers
to attempts of these organizations to push public policy in one direction or another on the behalf
of constituencies or a general political idea. Informality relates to the fact that interest groups do
not normally seek public office but pursue their goals through informal interactions with politicians
and bureaucrats. This, however, does not rule out that important facets of state-group relations
in capitalist democracies or in EU politics are heavily institutionalized.
The concept ‘interest group’ itself can be misleading as it refers to individuals, organizations
or institutions that are associated in a body that aims at influencing public policy. However, not
all interest group scholars study groups in this way. Some consider institutions (such as hospitals,
schools or universities), firms or local governments as interest groups or interest organizations (see
Gray and Lowery 2000). These institutions show some level of organization and exhibit policy
preferences. Accordingly, it makes sense to conceive of such actors as interest organizations that
are equivalent to interest groups, although they are not really aggregating the preferences of some
constituency. While many interest groups are indeed associations, a significant portion of the
field consists of organizations that act in part like interest groups even though their raison d’eˆtre
is usually not the representation of interests. Hence, interest groups and interest organizations
are united in their function to influence public policy. Distinguishing interest groups from interest
organizations acknowledges the existing heterogeneity and reduces some ambiguity through clearer
labeling (Jordan and Maloney 2007: 32–33).
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3 A fissured theoretical landscape
This section gives an overview of the major theoretical lenses on EU interest groups. EU interest
group research has moved from older theoretical perspectives that were derived from international
relations and comparative politics approaches, towards newer modes of analysis that are rooted in
policy studies, concepts of associative and deliberative democracy, and studies focusing on multi-
level governance and the Europeanization of interest groups. While most of these approaches have
been developed in other areas of Comparative Politics and International Relations, especially the
literature on multi-level governance and Europeanization studies do now feed back into other areas
of political science (see also Woll 2006). There is now a healthy variety of theoretical and analytical
lenses on EU interest groups but unfortunately communication among scholars working in different
traditions is rather poor. While these different perspectives may stimulate the debate on interest
group politics in the EU, they can also impede the accumulation of knowledge. I suggest that an
important reason for the lack of transparency of this literature and the emergence of contradictory
points of view is the compartmentalization of the theoretical traditions. It is therefore an important
task of future studies to engage in cross-cutting debates as well as in systematic theory testing
rather than staying in their research niches. A brief review of the major theoretical perspectives
shall illustrate that proposition:
Till the 1980s, two international relations approaches – neofunctionalism and intergovernmen-
talism – dominated the study of European integration. Both consider the impact of interest
organizations on the integration process but offer very different theoretical lenses on their political
role. Neofunctionalists (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963) were the first to study the role of interest orga-
nizations in the European Community. Their main research interest was in the changing nature of
international relations after World War II and the build-up of a supranational political organization
(Kohler-Koch 1992). Drawing partly on the American group approach of politics (Truman 1993)
and focusing on economic interest groups, they had strong hopes that business associations and
trade unions would be among the driving forces of European integration. In normative respects,
they appreciated the political engagement of these organizations because, presumably, interest
groups would not only contribute to the deepening of European integration and the peaceful res-
olution of conflicts but also to an increase in economic welfare throughout the EC. However, early
on it became clear to them that these theoretical expectations were not matched by their empirical
findings (Haas 1958: 318–359). During the consolidation of the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the set-back of the integration process in the 1960s and 1970s these questions lost there-
fore in relevance while others gained in prominence. Continued member state resistance against
important integration measures led Stanley Hoffmann (1966) to an intergovernmental account of
European integration in which interest organizations played only an insignificant role and caused
Ernst B. Haas (1975) to question the usefulness of regional integration theory altogether.
With the new dynamics of European integration in the mid-1980s, the search for the leading
actors of this transformation resurged: in line with the neofunctionalist tradition, supranational
institutionalists (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989) argued that business interests played an important
part in this transformation and later empirical studies presented some empirical evidence in support
of this argument (Cowles 1997; see also Collignon and Schwarzer 2005 on banking interests and
EMU). But scholars rooted in liberal intergovernmentalism viewed the integration process as the
outcome of bargaining among the large member states. They maintained that interest groups did
not have a great say in major policy decisions and that, in any case, they represent their interests
only to their national governments who would act as gatekeepers to the EU (Moravcsik 1998).
Hence, the strategies of interest groups in the EU system and their influence on EU policy-making
are contested – not only on the basis of empirical evidence but already on the grounds of theoretical
assumptions.
Scholars rooted in the comparative politics tradition discovered the political system of the
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European Community (EC) only in the 1970s. They were mostly interested in how interest inter-
mediation in the EC operated and what role associations played in EC decision-making (Meynaud
and Sidjanski 1971; Schwaiger and Kirchner 1981). Later, the emphasis shifted to the patterns
of interest intermediation (Averyt 1977) and the conditions of collective action in the European
Community. The dependence of EC level interest intermediation on national interest group sys-
tems came as much into focus as the new options which the EU institutions entailed for national
interest groups (Burkhardt-Reich and Schumann 1983). Several authors arrived at the conclusion
that the multi-layered and segmented European institutional setting promoted informal, sectoral,
and pluralistic patterns of interest intermediation rather than formal, cross-sectoral and corporatist
patterns (Averyt 1977; Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Following this line of reasoning, there is a
rather broad agreement that some form of pluralism is characteristic of EU interest intermediation
(Coen 1998; Cowles 2001; Schmidt 1999). However, even this assessment is not without its crit-
ics: Some studies found more formal and regularized relations among interest groups and the EU
institutions (Andersen and Eliassen 1991; Mazey and Richardson 2002: 124; Mahoney 2004) and
others detected quasi-corporatist patterns of interest intermediation in some policy-areas, notably
in EU harmonization policies and in the EU social dialogue (Eichener and Voelzkow 1994c; Falkner
1998).
Studies that discuss the contribution of interest organizations to European democracy also ar-
rive at fundamentally different conclusions: In his pioneering study that was rooted in a critical
appraisal of the pluralist perspective on interest groups, James Caporaso (1974) criticized the nar-
row pursuit of self-interests fearing that it might jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire integration
process. In recent years, the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU as well as the study of
social movements in the European Union nourished more favorable views on interest groups in the
EU (Imig and Tarrow 2001a; Balme, Chabanet, and Wright 2002; della Porta 2007). Among the
political institutions, the European Commission and the Economic and Social Committee empha-
size ways to make the political participation of civil society organizations – that are equivalent to
interest groups in the narrow sense presented above – more effective and democratic (see EC 2000,
2001, 2002). The theoretical debate on this topic focuses on the possibility and the prerequisites
of deliberative and associative democracy in Europe (see Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007). The
renewed interest in normative questions has also come to spur a number of empirical analyses on
this topic (Pollack 1997; Smismans 2004, 2006; Warleigh 2001). As a consequence, the study of
interest groups in the EU has been systematically linked to democratic theory and concepts of
political representation (for a useful overview, see Finke 2007).
With respect to the contribution of interest groups to European governance, the analytical
results are not unequivocal. Based on their analysis of associational self-regulation in EU har-
monization and standardization processes, Eichener and Voelzkow (1994c) concluded that interest
groups enhance the governability of the European Union. In contrast, rooted in a study of the
organizational characteristics of some 50 EU level business interest groups, Greenwood and Web-
ster (2000) suggest that these organizations are unable to act as governance partners of the EU
institutions. However, it is difficult to infer from these studies the conditions under which EU level
interest organizations are actors in their own right, serve as political fora in which their members
discuss their political options or are merely instruments of their dominant members.
In sum, the theoretical and empirical scope of EU interest group studies has widened tremen-
dously over time. Similarly, the scientific controversies about the adequate theoretical and method-
ological approach to EU interest intermediation have intensified. The field has clearly moved be-
yond the earlier stage of adapting the approaches developed in other fields of study to European
interest intermediation. Most notably, the concepts of multi-level governance and Europeanization
(see below) are rather new approaches that feed back into comparative politics and international
relations. For example, the study of multi-level governance gives new impetus to research on com-
parative federalism (Benz and Lehmbruch 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Nicola¨ıdis and Howse
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2001) and to studies of international organizations and their linkages to national politics. However,
in order to address some of the controversies and clarify the uncertainties associated with the roles
and functions of interest groups, the demarcations between different research communities need to
be brought down. Promising avenues are the cross-fertilization of interest group and social move-
ment research (Balme, Chabanet, and Wright 2002; Imig and Tarrow 2001a), of interest group
studies and analyses of political cleavages in the EU (see Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Beyers
and Kerremans 2004) as well as the incorporation of interest groups in the analysis of political
representation in the EU (see Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007).
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4 EU institutions and interest groups
4.1 The co-evolution of the EU institutions and interest groups
An abundance of studies emphasizes the importance of the EU institutional setting to the repre-
sentation of societal and economic interests (e.g. Mazey and Richardson 1993). The transfer of
political authority to the EU institutions is important for interest groups because political institu-
tions do not only ‘organize some conflicts into politics and some conflicts out of it‘ (Schattschneider
1960) but they also channel how these conflicts are being resolved. There is wide-ranging consensus
that the EU institutions are not just an opportunity structure for interest organizations in which
pursue their interests (Marks and McAdam 1996; Imig and Tarrow 2001b,c; della Porta 2007) but
that they shape the arenas of interest intermediation in manifold ways. They set up committees
and bodies for the regularized consultation of groups (Mazey and Richardson 2002; Mahoney 2004;
van Schendelen 2002), delegate policy-making and implementation powers to them (Falkner 1998;
Falkner et al. 2005), support a variety of interest organizations by providing finance, organizational
help and granting privileged access (Aspinwall and Greenwood 1998; Pollack 1997; Smismans 2004,
2006), set standards for appropriate interest group behaviour (EC 2001, 2002) – and pursue their
own policy preferences in alliances with groups that are supportive of their case.
More generally, some authors suggest that the EU institutional setting and the interest group
system co-evolved (Eichener and Voelzkow 1994a,b). With the increasing scope of EU regulation,
successive institutional reforms, and enlargements the EU-level interest group population has in-
creased considerably over time (Balme and Chabanet 2002; Greenwood 2003) feeding back into
the governance capacities of this complex institutional setting. Note that the exact number and
diversity of groups of the EU interest group system is not known. The various directories of interest
groups in the European Union comprise different types of organizations and differ with regard to
the total number of actors in each class (for a useful discussion, see Berkhout and Lowery 2008).
At the start of the European integration process (1950/60s) a small number of interest organi-
zations were active in Brussels. In the most dynamic phases of the EU/EC institutional evolution
– after the founding years and the moves towards the Internal Market and Monetary Union –, it
was mostly economic interest groups that responded most pronouncedly to the integration process
by forming new EU interest organizations. In response to greater social regulation, the number
of diffuse interests or NGOs has grown appreciably in recent years so that the bias that has been
present in the system has been somewhat reduced. In 2002, the Commission registry of civil soci-
ety organizations CONECCS (Consultation, the European Commission, and Civil Society) listed
885 EU level groups with approximately 80 per cent stemming from business and 20 per cent
representing diffuse or public interests.
Over time, the predominant organizational formats also changed. Initially, EU interest organi-
zations were mainly sectoral or cross-sectoral peak associations of national interest groups. Today
many are mixed membership groups that include combinations of national associations, multina-
tional corporations, other interest organizations as well as cities and regions. According to Justin
Greenwood (2003: 9), it is now also commonplace for large numbers of firms (ca. 250), national
associations (170), regions (171), and political, economic and legal consultants (ca. 280) to have
Brussels offices – and many more actors are frequent commuters heading from Bruxelles Midi to
Berlaymont.1
While the lobby-system in Brussels is therefore no longer in its nascent stage of development it
remains less stable and less consolidated than some national associational systems as a consequence
of the mutating EU constitutional structure. It is also likely that successive enlargements had
a significant impact on the EU system of interest representation – a largely under researched
1 Bruxelles Midi is the main train station in Brussels and Berlaymont is the headquarter of the European
Commission.
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phenomenon (but see Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008). Moreover, the increase in the number
of public affairs consultants and of large firm lobbying reflects the increasing professionalism of
lobbying activities both at the national and at the EU level.
More specifically, some studies focus on the vertical dimension of the EU multi-level setting
while others stress the horizontal segmentation of the EU into different pillars and institutions. It
is often said that the former leads to complex linkages across levels of government while the latter
tends to cause segmentation along policy issues and institutional competencies.
4.2 Multilevel governance and Europeanization
4.2.1 Multilevel governance and interest organizations
Several authors assert that the political opportunity structure of interest organizations and social
movements has profoundly changed due to European integration (Marks and McAdam 1996; Imig
and Tarrow 2001b). In several issue areas, European, national, and regional political processes are
now closely intertwined. In response, interest groups and social movements have come to partici-
pate more or less regularly in EU policy-making and -implementation. Usually, one of two main
analytical approaches is applied in order to capture how interest organizations responded to these
institutional changes: multi-level governance (MLG) (Marks and Hooghe 2001) and Europeaniza-
tion studies (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003) dominate the
study of vertical interactions. More recently, the concepts of venue shopping and the political con-
struction of scale have also been employed in order to illuminate the behaviour of interest groups
in the European Union setting (see Princen and Kerremans 2008).
The multi-level governance approach is supposed to capture the point that political authority is
dispersed across and shared among European and national institutions (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-
Koch 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2003). The delegation of powers to the European Commission,
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice made these institutions important
to the representation of interests. According to this concept, however, national institutions have
not become obsolete for national interest groups. In fact, national executives continue to enjoy
substantial EU policymaking powers as members of the EU Council or the European Council. And
as most EU policies are implemented by national institutions, these remain important addressees
of domestic interest groups. Therefore, many analysts claim that domestic groups need to pursue a
‘dual strategy’ and promote their interests now vis-a`-vis domestic and EU institutions (e.g. Kohler-
Koch 1997: 3). This differs remarkably from the liberal intergovernmental conception of European
politics in which domestic interest groups rely entirely on their national governments for the pursuit
of their EU related interests (Moravcsik 1998) because the national executives act as gatekeepers
to European politics aggregating domestic interests. Some authors have therefore characterized
the EU as a network polity (Ansell 2000) or as a system of network governance (Kohler-Koch and
Eising 1999).
Studies on the relations among federal (or multilevel) systems and interest group systems
suggest also three major reasons why the EU might form a fertile environment for interest groups to
flourish (Armingeon 2002: 214). First, political regulation in multilevel systems allows for greater
inter-regional differences in interest group organization than unitary states. Second, cultural,
social, and economic differences are more pronounced in multilevel systems than in unitary states,
giving rise to greater variety in the interest group landscape. Finally, in unitary states, interest
groups have greater incentives to concentrate on central-level representation, whereas the dispersion
of political authority in multilevel systems makes for greater differentiation within the associational
landscape. Hence, most of the evidence points to multilevelness as being conducive to the formation
of a great variety of interest groups.
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4.2.2 The Europeanization of interest organizations
Whereas the multi-level governance perspective seeks to integrate different territorial levels in a
unified framework of analysis, Europeanization studies maintain the analytical separation of these
layers. These analyses concentrate on the impact the EU has on national interest groups and
patterns of interest intermediation (Cowles 2001; Falkner 2000; Schmidt 1999; Grossmann and
Saurugger 2004). They seek to identify cross-national similarities and differences, denote areas of
convergence, and trace the causal mechanisms of these processes.
So far, the systematic and comparative study of the EU impact on domestic interests is confined
to a limited number of member states. Most analyses concentrate also on certain categories of
interests. The few comparative studies concentrate on three large Western European member
states – France, Germany, the United Kingdom (Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001; Eising 2004) or tend
to include smaller Western and Northern European member states (Lehmkuhl 1999; Schneider,
Finke, and Baltz 2007). Further Europeanization studies are country studies. Interestingly, so far
the contribution of the EU to the consolidation of democracy and civil society in the Southern
and Eastern European member states is little explored (Perez-Solorzano Borraga´n 2003). In fact,
it might be difficult to generalize from these studies to the interest group systems of the new EU
member states that have come only relatively recently into being (see Lowery, Poppelaars, and
Berkhout 2008 on the importance of contextual factors). Hence, we have obtained rather detailed
knowledge about a few member states and issue areas but we lack comprehensive evidence about
the Europeanization of interest groups across the union.
Some Europeanization studies look into the EU impact on domestic modes of interest interme-
diation. The literature on state-society relations distinguishes among four such modes: pluralism,
corporatism, statism, and networks. While many scholars still look at national interest group
systems in Europe as independent units (Siaroff 1999), Europeanization studies draw attention to
the embeddedness of these systems in the European Union. A core hypothesis often linked to the
Europeanization concept is that the degree of fit among the European and the domestic situation
is decisive for the national adaptation to the EU (Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). Frequently,
a high (low) degree of fit is associated with low (high) adaptation pressures in the member states.
Following this line of reasoning, Vivien Schmidt (1999; see also Falkner 2000) analyzes the
repercussions of the EU on the domestic modes of interest intermediation in France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Italy. She finds that quasi-pluralistic patterns are prevalent at the EU level
and argues that German corporatism fits this mode better than the statism that she identifies in
the UK, Italy and France. Consequently, adaptation pressures – and difficulties – would be greater
in this group of countries than in Germany. However, Maria Green Cowles (2001) arrives at
fundamentally different results in her study of the impact which EU foreign trade policy-making
in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) has on national industry federations. She also
rests her case on the degree of fit argument and characterizes the EU mode as a form of ‘elite
pluralism’ because, in the context of the TABD, large firms have a direct say in the formulation
of EU foreign economic policy. She argues that this elite pluralism poses a greater challenge to
associations socialized in German corporatism and French statism than to those that are used to
British pluralism. Cowles finds empirical support for her argument in the German and British cases
and contends that the French industry association has actually been empowered on the domestic
level due to its involvement in the TABD negotiations. Hence, the findings of these studies on the
Europeanization of interest intermediation are quite contradictory.
Both conceptual and empirical aspects account for these differences: Both authors conceive
differently of pluralism and stress different elements of this concept. Vivien Schmidt (1999: 157–
162) paints a broad picture of the cross-sectoral EU policy-making process ranging from policy
formulation and implementation. By contrast, Maria Green Cowles focuses on the patterns of
decision-making in a sub-sectoral forum of EU trade policy and on their fit with domestic foreign
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economic policy formation. She finds that large firms are more involved in EU foreign trade
policymaking than are industry federations. Stressing the aspect of consensus formation in the
making of policies, Vivien Schmidt identifies a high degree of fit among European quasi-pluralism
and German corporatism. In contrast, Maria Green Cowles highlights the different roles that firms
and associations supposedly play in each system thus arriving at a poor degree of fit.
Their conceptual differences lead the authors to classify one of their cases differently. While the
EU mode is held to be pluralistic, the German mode corporatist and the French mode statist, the
authors disagree on the United Kingdom. Vivien Schmidt groups the UK among the statist coun-
tries because the British government has excluded interest organizations on important occasions
from policy formation, whereas Maria Green Cowles puts the UK in the pluralistic camp because
both firms and the British industry federation are routinely involved in British policy formation.
More generally, these difficulties stem from problems that are built into typological analysis.
Not only are different elements being used to construct these typologies but also these typological
elements do not always co-vary in the way envisaged. Empirically, even those cases that have been
allotted to one and the same type may vary greatly. This makes it of course difficult to determine
the prevalent modes of interest intermediation and to establish their ‘degree of fit’.
4.3 Institutional segmentation, negotiation systems, and policy networks
Most comparative research finds a growing diversity and density of the interest group population
in advanced political economies (Atkinson and Coleman 1989, 1992). Variations across policy
areas, policy issues and along the policy cycle in the EU are traced to both the characteristics
of different issue areas and the characteristics of the EU institutions. The institutional context
defines the opportunities to get in touch with EU decision-makers (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971:
468; Marks and McAdam 1996). Notably, three elements of the EU institutional setting are said
to shape the relations with interest groups: its segmentation into three pillars, the allocation of
powers to its institutions, and their vertical and functional differentiation. As it comprises the
vast majority of the Union’s policies, the subsequent analysis concentrates on the first pillar, the
European Community (EC).
The allocation of legislative and executive powers to the EU institutions causes variations along
the policy-cycle as well along policy areas. The European Commission’s legal monopoly over policy
initiation grants it a crucial role in agenda setting and policy formulation. Numerous empirical
studies have demonstrated that it is the most important point of contact for interest groups in
these phases of the policy-cycle (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Coen
1997, 1998; Bouwen 2002a,b; Balme and Chabanet 2002). Despite its role as a guardian of the
treaties in policy implementation EU level interest groups pay less attention to its activities in
the later phases of the policy cycle. National interest organizations split their activities more
evenly across the entire policy cycle (see Eising 2004). The Commission’s internal differentiation
also causes some variance: it is rarely approached as a collegiate body. Rather, interest groups
maintain relations with one or more of its Directorates-General that are responsible for specific
policy areas.
Over time, the European Parliament has acquired substantial legislative powers and has become
more important to interest groups (Kohler-Koch 1997). Nonetheless, even today, it is often held to
be less important than the Council or the Commission because its influence varies tremendously
along legislative procedures. The EP is considered to represent supranational and citizen inter-
ests in EU policy-making. Being elected by national voters, its members seem more amenable to
national interests than the Commission and more open to diffuse interests, including those repre-
senting the environment, consumers, or large social groups such as the unemployed and pensioners.
Owing to its decisive position, the EU Council would seem to be a highly relevant contact for
interest groups. Given its relatively few meetings and its composition of national delegates, the
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Council and its administrative machinery is rarely lobbied in Brussels. For the most part, access
to the EU Council occurs through national groups via the national ministries rather than directly
to the collective decision-making body of the EU (Michalowitz 2004). The European Council is
more removed from interest group pressure. Not only does it comprise the heads of state and
government, but it also meets formally only once every six months, lessening its impact on the
minutiae of day-to-day politics in the EU.
As the EU judiciary, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) monitors compliance with and
interprets EU law. The preliminary rulings procedure offers interest organizations a channel to
have questions of European law referred to the ECJ whose interpretations might invalidate domestic
laws. However, in practice, to take a case to the European Court usually demands that a body of
EU law already exists. And even where this is the case, the outcome of such action is uncertain, the
financial costs heavy, and the duration of the case generally lengthy, which means that this avenue
is not available to all citizens and interest groups, and will only be worthwhile when the stakes are
felt to be especially high. Therefore, litigation strategies appear to be a rarer phenomenon than
legislative lobbying by interest groups (see Bouwen and McCown 2007).
Finally, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), set up to channel the opinions of organized
interests within the European policy process, has only consultative rights in EU legislation. The
ESC is a tripartite body composed of individual members representing employers, workers, and
other interests. It is generally considered to be of marginal importance for the representation of
interests within the EU.
Given the functional segmentation of the EU institutions, their internal differentiation as well
as the variations along policy areas, several authors find it impossible to identify cross-sectoral
patterns of interest intermediation. They claim that the EU patterns are sector- or policy-specific
(Greenwood and Ronit 1994; Falkner 2000). In this vein, since the 1980s, many policy studies have
come to enrich the empirical research on interest groups in the European Community. While mostly
seeking to describe or explain the evolution of European policies, several authors analyze in great
detail how organized interests adapted to European policy-making and what influence they had on
EU policies. Highlighting the importance of sectoral or policy characteristics, they place sectoral
negotiation systems (Grande 1996) or policy networks at the heart of their analysis (Peterson
2003; Bo¨rzel 1997). Emphasizing variance across sectors and policy areas, this perspective receives
additional support through the increasing number of studies that highlight the complexity of
EU governance. For instance, Helen Wallace (2005) distinguishes among five different modes of
governance in the EU giving examples from five different issue areas.
A few recent studies go even further. Taking into account the ‘elusive fluidity’ of EU policy
making (Kassim 1994), they take individual issues as reflected by EU directives as their main
units of analyses. Recent quantitative studies generalize on the basis of the samples of issues
they analyze (Mahoney 2007; Schneider, Finke, and Baltz 2007). Several analyses suggest that
EU policy-networks tend to become more open for new actors and also larger as a consequence
of the growing scope of EU regulation as well as the successive enlargements. Clearly, this can
put established patterns of alliance formation to the test. At the same time, the struggle for the
attention of the EU institutions becomes more intense and the uncertainty about the direction of
EU policy-making increases. However, there is mixed evidence about these developments. On the
one hand, several case studies illustrate indeed that more and more ad hoc coalitions are formed
and that issue specific campaigns are on the rise (Pijnenburg 1998; Aspinwall 1998; Warleigh
2000). Interest organizations that were able to enjoy a representative monopoly for their domain
at the EU level such as the European Environmental Bureau from the 1970s till the second half
of the 1980s are now facing competition from other groups in their domain and must develop
workable arrangements and a division of labor with them. On the other hand, patterns of alliance
formation seem to be marked by long-standing ideological cleavages (Beyers 2004) and concentrate
on the cooperation with isomorphic organizations (Eising 2009). Finding oneself beside strange
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bedfellows in issue coalitions may be a rarer phenomenon than is sometimes suggested (see also
Mahoney 2007).
More generally, since the 1980s, the increased number of groups that do not represent occupa-
tional or business interests has reduced the bias that has long been present in the EU associational
system. This does not necessarily mean that public interests have a greater voice in EU policy-
making because their political clout is hampered by their lesser capacity to organize and mobilize
sanctions (Imig and Tarrow 2001b,c). But according to several observers, there is now a greater
variety of cleavages in EU policy-making and groups that mobilize around ideas and norms have
increased in importance (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Wessels 2004; Finke 2007).
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5 Organizational mobilization, access, and influence
Why then do groups mobilize in the EU, what access do they have to policy-makers, and what
impact do they have on EU policies? These core questions of EU interest group studies are
also of major relevance to the comparative study of interest groups. In recent years, a body of
comprehensive empirical studies has engaged in systematic theory-testing on these issues (Bennett
1997; Beyers 2002, 2004; Beyers and Kerremans 2004; Bouwen 2002a,b; Coen 1997, 1998, 2007;
Du¨r and De Bie´vre 2007a,b; Eising 2004, 2007a,b; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Mahoney 2004,
2007; Schneider, Finke, and Baltz 2007). It is interesting to note that the explanations of political
mobilization, access to policy-makers and political influence focus in part on the same explanatory
factors, but put different emphases on them, and arrive, in part, at different findings. Before
addressing these issues in more detail, it is important to note that there is a general agreement
about the following issues:
EU regulation is a strong stimulus for interest groups to mobilize, seek access, and exert influ-
ence on EU policies (Caporaso 1974: 27; Cram 1998: 67–69).
Resources such as policy information, financial means, constituency size, and economic clout
are important prerequisites for both access and influence, notably, policy information is deemed
to be a crucial exchange good by many authors (Bouwen 2002a,b; Crombez 2002; Mazey and
Richardson 1993).
The predominance of bureaucratic politics and consensus formation among member states in
the EU system support insider rather than outsider strategies of interest groups (Imig and Tarrow
2001a; Warleigh 2001; Rucht 2002).
5.1 Collective action and organizational mobilization
Studies on the logic of collective action have yielded fairly robust insights about the factors that
shape the organization of interests at EU level. An important study rooted in the collective
action paradigm came to the conclusion that there is no real collective action problem in the EU
(Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). Based on the classic analyses put forward by Olson Jr (1965)
and by Clark and Wilson (1961), Aspinwall and Greenwood (1998) distinguish among selective
and collective incentives to join associations on the one hand and material and social incentives
on the other. They rest their empirical case on surveys of both EU associations and their national
members. Their findings suggest that collective interest representation and policy information are
crucial for the decision to join EU associations. In contrast, specific material incentives offered
by the EU associations play a much lesser role (see also Sidenius 1998: 96–99 on Danish interest
groups) thus undermining Olson’s logic of collective action. Later empirical studies corroborated
that neither the kind nor the number of their selective material incentives affect the membership
density of EU-level groups (Eising and Kohler-Koch 2005).
Apparently, the decision to join EU associations is not really guided by specific cost-benefit
analyses, but by more diffuse considerations: Collective interest representation is deemed necessary
when representing interests vis-a`-vis EU institutions. In essence, the cost of membership is an
insurance premium (see Jordan 1998) that seems well worth paying for. The opportunity costs
of non-membership can be enormous: they range from null (when there is no need for lobbying)
over the cost of hired consultants or individual monitoring and lobbying efforts to organizational
annihilation. Therefore, membership is rarely questioned and fully-fledged exit is hardly an option
(see Greenwood 2002: 242–249). It is far more likely that members raise their voices in order
to obtain a greater say in the associational bodies (see Platzer 1984 and Cowles 1997 on the
reorganization of UNICE2), streamline the associational landscape in a sector (see Grote and Lang
2003 on telecoms; Lehmkuhl 1999 on transport), cut down organizational costs and improve the
2 The former Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe is Businesseurope since January 2007.
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coordination of interest representation (see Coen 1998, 2007), or work unilaterally or in coalitions
beside the EU level interest groups. However, it would be interesting to confront this evidence
with analyses studying the population ecology of EU associations in order to draw a better picture
of the evolution of the EU interest group landscape.
Besides the EU institutional factors and the incentive structures some contextual factors are
held to be important. The embeddedness of actors in domestic and international associational
systems is said to affect EU level interest representation: Experiences in transnational and inter-
national associations reduce transaction costs and can ease organized collective action in the EU
(on UNICE, see Haas 1958: 324; Platzer 1984). Moreover, Grant Jordan (1998: 32) claims that
the organization of interests at the domestic level constitutes the basic decision about whether
collective action takes place. The formation of Eurogroups is only a secondary decision about
the how of collective action at EU level even if in several instances political entrepreneurship was
necessary to bring European associations into being (e.g., Haas 1958; Cowles 1997).
Yet other studies point to socio-economic and technical dynamics such as in the merging of
telecommunications, media and information technology (Bartle 1999: 369–370; Knill 2001; Grote
and Lang 2003). Already in the pluralist tradition of interest groups, these factors have been
considered to be important influences on the organization of interests (see Truman 1993: 75)
because they reduce the cost of organization and communication, change the scope of interest
domains, raise new issues that associations must deal with, or because they open up new courses
of action. However, the newer generation of EU interest group studies no longer considers these
factors as sufficient influences on the formation and mobilization of groups pointing to additional
contextual and actor-related factors.
5.2 The access to EU policy-makers
The study of collective action in the EU focuses mostly on the motivation and the incentives of
actors to get organized at the EU level. Analyses that seek not only to explain the membership
decision but look into interest group access and influence usually take a broader set of explanatory
and contextual factors into account. It is common to conceptualize access as the number of contacts
that interest groups maintain with the EU institutions (see Bouwen 2002a,b; Beyers 2002). By now,
it is well established that the EU institutions are quite open to interest organizations (Mazey and
Richardson 1993, 2002). Accordingly, interest group politics in the EU centres on insider rather
than outsider strategies (see Broscheid and Coen 2003; Beyers 2004). When pursuing insider
strategies, interest groups seek direct access to EU policy-makers e.g. by tabling position papers
or participating in committee meetings. When pursuing outsider strategies, they tend to have more
recourse to the media or mobilize the public through protests or other activities (see Wilson 1973;
Walker 1991). Even though the strategies groups employ can vary across issues and even though
groups may combine both strategies on some issues, there is a trade-off when seeking direct access
to and building trustful relations with the European Commission or the European Parliament and
simultaneously blaming or threatening these institutions through the news.
I discuss the access of interest groups to the EU institutions by comparing business interests to
social movements. The former are generally said to apply insider strategies while the latter have
greater recourse to outsider strategies. Business interest organizations are likely to seek and obtain
access to EU policy-makers because their member firms are subject to EU regulation, because they
tend to be more resourceful than non-commercial interests, and usually seek face-to-face contacts
with policy-makers in order to pursue their interests. However, in a study of 800 national and EU
business associations, the emergence of the EU multi-level setting has not led to a fully-fledged
convergence of interest group behaviour (Eising 2004). While a significant minority of groups
now represents their interests regularly vis-a`-vis national and EU institutions, the majority of the
domestic business groups does not extend its activities to the EU level. Variations within domestic
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interest group systems are caused by the division of labour among the groups, some of whom are
more concerned with providing services or coordinating markets than with interest representation.
Moreover, multi-level players who act both at the domestic level and at the EU level tend to have
more resources than the groups that are nested within domestic settings. International variations
among the French, German and British groups can in part be attributed to different modes of
interest representation. However, as discussed, it is controversial whether German corporatism is
a more fertile ground for EU level activities than British pluralism or French statism (see also
Schmidt 1999; Cowles 2001). The empirical evidence is rather mixed.
Subject to less EU regulation, in control of fewer resources, thriving on outsider strategies,
and dwelling on more or less fluid domestic social networks and supporters, social movements
can be expected to respond less pronouncedly to European integration. Accordingly, Imig and
Tarrow (2001b; 2001c) found in their study of 9,872 protest events between 1984 and 1997 that
only five per cent of these protests were responses to European Union institutions or policies. 95%
of all protests were related to regional or national affairs and only 5% were directed at the EU.
83% of these protests against the EU took place within single member states, only 17% of them
were the outcome of transnational collaboration. Finally, 82% of the EU protests were staged by
occupational groups like farmers, fishers and coal miners. These are heavily affected by EU market
regulation and have a tradition of political protests on domestic grounds. Only some 18% of the
contentious actions against the EU were the outcome of political mobilization by non-occupational
groups. This is a striking difference to national protests in which these groups account for a
large portion of contentious action. While Imig and Tarrow (2001a; 2001b) identify a gradual
increase in the use of contentious action against the EU other studies do not yield the same result
(Rucht 2002). In sum, there is limited contentious action in response to European integration, the
evidence about an increasing trend towards protests is mixed, and these protests do usually not
involve social or advocacy groups but occupational groups.
Also here, the institutional context is important. The complexity of the EU multilevel setting is
said to cause troubles for social movements (Rucht 2002). Political protest is targeted at the media
and the public whose support is supposed to bring about the desired political change. However,
political communication about the EU takes usually place within national borders. There is still
no transnational European public (see de Vreese 2007 and the contributions in Kohler-Koch and
Rittberger 2007). Only in the member states does public opinion have an immediate effect on public
policy-makers who are accountable to their voters (della Porta 2007). In the EU, this mechanism
is less developed because the elections to the European Parliament are ‘second order’ elections and
because the EU executive is not at the disposal of voters (see Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008).
Hence, there are relatively few protests against the EU and most of them are staged in national
arenas and targeted at national audiences and policy-makers.
Finally, to some extent, domestic embeddedness is supposed to explain the political behaviour
of interest groups in the EU (Eising 2004; Beyers 2002: 35; Cowles 2001; Schmidt 1999). On
the one hand, it is plausible to assume a negative correlation among domestic embeddedness and
European activities: The closer their relations with domestic institutions, the less interest groups
need to or aspire to become involved in EU politics. But on the other hand, a positive relation may
be found. Close relations with domestic institutions can improve the organizational capacity to
voice concerns at EU level. In turn, these European activities may help to consolidate the position
in domestic politics.
Studies on the political behaviour of business interests (Eising 2004) indicate that none of these
general propositions finds full empirical support: while it can be safely ruled out that weak domestic
embeddedness generates more access at the EU level, strong embeddedness has ambiguous effects:
while more than 50% of the business associations that maintain close relations with domestic
institutions have not incorporated the EU institutions in their strategies of interest representation
some 40% have extended their political activities to the EU level on a routine basis. Hence, the
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effect of strong domestic embeddedness on the access to EU policy-makers is contingent upon
other conditions such as the division of labor in the associational system, organizational resources,
and EU institutional change: for instance, only the combined sticks and carrots of the dynamic
European regulatory agenda – including threats of social regulation and the prospect of market
integration – and of the changing institutional opportunity structure – entailing the loss of member
state vetoes in the Council of Ministers in the Single European Act – propelled large firms to act
increasingly at the EU level in the late 1970s and mid-1980s (Greenwood, Grote, and Ronit 1992;
McLaughlin, Jordan, and Maloney 1993; Cowles 1997; Coen 1997, 1998).
5.3 The influence of interest groups on EU policy-making
What impact do interest groups leave on EU policies? While the access of interest groups is
comparatively easy to conceptualize, to measure, and to verify, establishing the influence of groups
is notoriously tricky (see also Du¨r and De Bie´vre 2007a). As a consequence, it is not well understood
and contested what say groups have in EU policies. Remember the International Relations debate
between supranational institutionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists about the influence of
business interest groups on the Single Market Programme (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Moravcsik
1998). Studies on the influence of groups focus on the political economy of European integration as
well as on the role of private and public actors in EU policy-making. Recent studies are increasingly
aware of the methodological pitfalls that are involved in analysing influence.
How then does the EU affect the influence of interest organizations and state institutions?
Studies centering on the structure of the EU political economy stress the efforts at the making of
a regional market and at transnational economic regulation (see Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Pollack
and Shaffer 2001). Critical political economy theories suggest that European integration promotes
transnational neo-liberalism and spurs new transnational dynamics of European capital (Holman
and van der Pijl 2003: 89). In essence, European integration benefits and is subject to the influence
of the transnational sections of capital while at the same time subduing labor by exerting severe
pressures on the flexibility of domestic labor markets. Liberal political economy studies share the
insight that large firms have become key players in transnational regulation and set important
parts of the agenda of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) between the United States
and the European Union. But the relationship that has emerged among state and business in
this dialogue is viewed as a partnership (see Cowles 2001). This means that the dialogue need
not always be unequivocally beneficial to international capital. Note, however, that the parallel
Transnational Labor Dialogue between American and European peak labor federations lacks both
the differentiated structure of the TABD and equivalent regulatory components. This has led its
critics to regard it as ‘a structure without action’ (Knauss and Trubek 2001: 250) indicating that
the policy agenda of the EU favors business interests over labor interests.
From a different perspective that centers on EU decision-making processes, it is not clear who
wields influence: it is contested whether European integration enhances the influence of state
institutions or that of (specific) interest organizations on public policy. On the one hand, several
authors draw on Robert Putnam’s (1988) notion of two-level-games placing it in the institutional
setting of the EU in order to assess the influence of interest groups. Three factors are enlisted
to support the hypothesis that EU policymaking strengthens state actors rather than interest
groups. Andrew Moravcsik (1998) has emphasized that European integration strengthens national
executives who act as gate keepers between the national and the European arenas. He claims
that they obtain more resources from European integration than any other actors. It appears
that European integration strengthens their capacity to set the domestic political agenda, control
policy information, justify state activity, and contain the ability of opposing actors to veto their
political initiatives. Moreover, domestic interest organizations may also lose ground due to what
Edgar Grande (1996) calls the ‘paradox of weakness’: the involvement of public actors in EU
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negotiations and their efforts to build compromises in EU decision-making may actually allow
them to gain autonomy vis-a`-vis private actors. A strategy of ‘self-binding’ themselves to certain
policy stances and references to negotiation pressures in the EU may be suitable means to turn
down unwarranted interest group demands. Finally, the complexity of the EU multilevel system
and the allocation of competencies to a multitude of public actors is said to make it impossible
for interest organizations to identify ‘the’ decisive locus of political authority in the EU (Grande
1996). Several empirical studies have indeed identified a strong to dominant position of national
executives in the EU negotiation systems (e.g. Wolf 2005; Schneider, Finke, and Baltz 2007).
On the other hand, several authors doubt that European integration generally strengthens state
actors vis-a`-vis interest organizations. They highlight different aspects of the EU institutional set-
ting and emphasize the cooperation of public and private actors in EU policy networks. Some
authors argue that the EU multilevel system increases the influence of interest organizations be-
cause it grants them many points of access (Pollack 1997). They pay greater attention to the total
number of access points than to the negotiation logic that may arise from the interlocking struc-
ture of political authority in the multilevel setting. In this view, easy access to and the resource
dependencies of the EU institutions may tip the balance in favor of private players.
Yet other institutionalist arguments emphasize the legal opportunities of the EU system. The
supranational character of EU law, the practice of the European Court of Justice to view many
EU legal provisions as creating rights for individuals, and the increasing use of the preliminary
rulings procedure allows interest organizations to proceed against domestic rules and practices.
Therefore, not only Jill Lovecy (1999: 148) reaches the conclusion that EU law may sometimes
allow “policy outsiders” at the national level to come centre-stage at the EC level’ and overturn
‘entrenched national and sub-national [...] practices which have been the product of those who
are “policy insiders” within the member states’. However, bringing a case to the court is costly,
time consuming and usually requires an established body of favorable EU law. As its outcome is
uncertain and may not apply to other cases, this route is not open to each and every actor. It
appears that the preferred route of most actors is legislative lobbying rather than litigation (see
Bouwen and McCown 2007).
A third group of institutional arguments stresses the horizontal differentiation of the EU. They
point out that national executives may not gain autonomy across the entire range of EU policy
areas. The strengthening of public vis-a`-vis private actors has been found in studies that analyzed
either treaty reforms or policy areas in which the executives enjoy decision-making rights. In the
Social Dialogue, such rights have been accorded to the EU social partners. Therefore, information
asymmetries may arise in favor of the national social partners rather than the national governments
because the former are closely involved in European social policy-making (see Falkner et al. 2005).
However, as this quasi-corporatist arrangement applies only to a limited area of social policy, it is
not well suited to invalidate the assessment that public actors gain vis-a`-vis private actors in EU
policy-making. But more generally, EU politics need not always lead to information asymmetries
in favor of state institutions.
Finally, those studies drawing on the literature about policy networks or advocacy coalitions
(Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Peterson 2003; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) pose a conceptual
challenge to the claim that private interests lose out to public institutions. They emphasize that
European policies are predominantly made in constellations that consist of both private and public
actors and that may stretch from the EU level into the member states. In this perspective, it is
necessary to disaggregate the public and the private sectors, rather than referring to the ‘public
sphere’ or the ‘private sphere’ alone in order to identify in detail the winners and the losers. In sum,
good reasons are given for both the perspective that the EU strengthens the state and the point of
view that private actors are empowered so that the evidence on this question is yet inconclusive.
In methodological terms, case studies and comparative analyses need to apply careful process
tracing methods and put competing propositions to the test in order to provide a persuasive
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account of the say of private actors in EU politics (Eising 2006; see also Du¨r and De Bie´vre 2007a).
Nonetheless, even well designed qualitative studies face difficulties to attribute policy outcomes to
specific causes and isolate the role of interest groups. This may allow for alternative interpretations
of the events. For example, Edgar Grande (1996) has developed the ‘paradox of weakness’ (see
above) on the basis of a case study about the involvement of German actors in EU information
and communication technology policy. But the strengthening of public actors vis-a`-vis private
actors is not the only lesson one can draw from this case: According to other accounts, the initial
EU information technology-program ESPRIT was drawn up by a coalition of large firms and the
Commission against the resistance of the large member states’ administrations (Sandholtz 1992)
so that, in fact, the very case that gave rise to the theorem entails substantial evidence against it.
Quantitative studies usually apply spatial models or survey methods to establish the influence
of actors on EU decision-making or on the formation of national positions regarding EU policy
(e.g. Schneider, Finke, and Baltz 2007). Having the advantage that they do not suffer from the
‘small N – large X’ problem, they can generalize on the basis of a large number of cases. In
one way or the other, the spatial models measure how close the policy outcome is to the actors’
preferences (see also Du¨r 2008). However, this procedure may be criticized on different accounts:
an outcome close to the actors’ preferences does not automatically imply that these had a say in
the decision. To solve this problem, greater attention needs to be devoted to the mechanisms by
which actors seek to exert influence. Moreover, measuring only the shift from the formal policy
proposal to the final legislative act overlooks the informal dynamics of agenda setting that precede
this development. In surveys, scholars may also directly ask interest groups to assess their own
influence on EU policy. Obviously, this method has the drawback that interest organizations
may overstate their own influence in order to legitimize the resource flows from their members.
Controlling for the assessments of state actors would seem useful to improve the validity of such
results. As a consequence of these pitfalls, in a study of EU trade policy-making that focuses on
the role of advocacy groups, Du¨r and De Bie´vre (2007b) combine survey methods with qualitative
analysis. In this policy area and for the development NGOs they analyze, they arrive at a persuasive
account of ‘access without influence’.
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6 Conclusions
The literature on interest group politics in the European Union has generated a wealth of insights
that have consolidated our knowledge on several aspects of EU collective action: In general, we
know why groups mobilize in the EU, what strategies they tend to employ in the EU institutional
setting, and what are their major points of access in the EU multilevel system and at the EU-level.
Many studies stress that the EU institutions are not merely an arena in which to pursue given
interests but that these institutions shape the ground of interest group politics in manifold ways.
In EU interest intermediation, policy information is usually held to be the critical resource that is
exchanged among policy-makers and interest groups.
However, on other topics our knowledge is more limited and on yet other themes it is contro-
versial. Broadening the literature would allow for incorporating important new research problems.
Some empirical research gaps – such as the EU effects on the development of civil society in Eastern
Europe or the vertical interaction of interest groups in the multilevel system – may be addressed
by designing comparative studies with a broader focus that include countries, issues and organiza-
tions that have so far been neglected. Currently, efforts are under way to fill in a major theoretical
research gap – the contribution of interest organizations to European democracy and social capital
– both by designing empirical work on this topic and by reinterpreting the empirical findings of
previous work.
The research controversies about the segmentation of EU interest intermediation, the patterns
of alliance formation, the Europeanization of interest intermediation, and the influence of groups
on EU policies would benefit from cross-cutting debates across different strands of the literature
and from more rigorous theory-testing. Accordingly, the recent dialogue between social movement
research and interest group studies, the embedding of interest group studies in broader theories
of political representation, its linkages to analyses of the broader cleavage structures in the EU,
and the increasing number of comprehensive empirical studies are promising new avenues in this
literature.
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